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ABSTRACT 
Acquisition reform has attempted to change the procurement process over the past 
several years. Some believe the reform measures have been changes in policy or revisions 
of a paperwork process. The draw down of the workforce and financial constraints 
demand acquisition professionals conduct business in a smarter, more efficient manner. 
The technology today provides Internet platforms that allow the commercial marketplace 
to take advantage of electronic commerce. The Army has implemented a reverse auction 
program designed to capture many of the practices in use in the commercial industry. 
Foremost, dynamic pricing replaces  fixed pricing models observed in traditional 
procurement strategies. Reverse auctions offer the Government the means to replicate a 
successful commercial practice that is becoming the accepted way of doing business. 
This thesis reviews performance of the Army's Reverse Auction pilot program after its 
first year of use. Three buying cases and 40 other reverse auctions are reviewed. The 
comparative analysis identifies commonalities for success and differences between past 
experiences with the reverse auction. The thesis concludes acquisitions for items that 
resemble commercial products and based on price are most successful in reverse 
auctions. The 43 auctions reviewed resulted in $1,606,395 saved. The mean savings was 
21.83% for the auctions reviewed. 
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I.       INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the basic characteristics of a reverse 
auction as an alternative method of procurement for the Department of the Army. 
Auction technologies provide an immense potential for cost savings. Other benefits 
include reduced administrative time and effort, decreased cycle time, and improved 
customer satisfaction. Reverse auctions offer the Government the means to replicate a 
successful commercial practice that is becoming the accepted way of doing business. The 
thesis reviews performance of the Army's Reverse Auction pilot program in three buying 
cases and 43 other reverse auctions. The comparative analysis identifies commonalities 
for success and differences between past experiences with the reverse auction. The results 
are analyzed and a set of conclusions and recommendations are developed. The thesis 
concludes by providing expected benefits and best uses for future users of reverse auction 
strategies in order to leverage the power being brought about by the Internet revolution. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Acquisition reform has attempted to change the procurement process over the past 
several years. Some believe the reform measures have been changes in policy or revisions 
of a paperwork process. The draw down of the acquisition workforce and financial 
constraints demand acquisition professionals conduct business in a smarter, more 
efficient manner. The technological capability today provides Internet platforms that 
allow the commercial marketplace to take advantage of electronic commerce. The Army 
has implemented a reverse auction program designed to capture many of the practices in 
use in the commercial industry. Foremost, dynamic pricing replaces fixed pricing models 
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observed in traditional procurement strategies. Reverse auctions represent a dynamic 
pricing environment. 
A reverse auction is one type of numerous auction techniques. A reverse auction 
is the opposite of an auction. Multiple sellers compete for the business of a single buyer. 
This process causes the price to be driven down, versus upward in a traditional auction. 
The bidding continues until a pre-established bidding time expires. Ideally, the lowest bid 
is made prior to the bidding time expiring. At the conclusion of the bidding time a winner 
is selected for award. 
Competition is a key aspect of a dynamic marketplace. Electronic commerce 
provides consumers with instant access to an unlimited marketplace [Ref. 1]. This large- 
scale marketplace brings to bear the true nature of a competitive market economy. 
Limitations of space and time are removed in this model because the bidder community is 
not limited to a small population. The technologies present today allow the bidding 
population to span the global community. 
The reverse auction creates the potential for realized savings if the competition 
bids below the price established by the price analysis. Price analysis helps determine 
what price is fair and reasonable. Price analysis is of particular importance because it is 
directly related to the possible savings incurred by the procuring agency. The price 
analysis establishes the starting point for the opening bid. Theoretically, this price would 
be the maximum amount the agency would pay using traditional procurement methods. 
In essence, the dynamic pricing present in a reverse auction defines the savings realized. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
What is the best use of a reverse auction as an acquisition tool by United States 
Army contracting agencies? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
What is a reverse auction? 
What is a good candidate for reverse auction? 
How is the opening bid price established? 
Does a reverse auction provide savings to the Government? 
What factors must be considered in determining whether a requirement is 
suitable for use of reverse auction techniques? 
Are there any statutory issues associated with executing a reverse auction? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
Research investigation included a literature search of books, magazine articles, 
CD-ROM systems, Government reports and regulations, Internet based materials and 
other library information resources. Data were collected via interviews, lessons learned 
reports, and spreadsheets. Interviews were conducted with contracting officials in buying 
agencies that support the United States Army and personnel responsible for developing 
the reverse auction capability through the United States Army Communications- 
Electronics Command (CECOM) and the Army Single Face to Industry (ASFI). 
Interviews were conducted over the phone and through electronic mail exchanges. 
E. SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION 
This thesis focuses on reviewing the reverse auction concept and its application in 
an electronic environment initiated by CECOM's pilot program. Three Army 
procurement agencies and their application of the technology provide the basis for data 
collection. Limited data from 43 reverse auctions, including the three cases, conducted 
since May 2000 also provides insight. The analysis of the 43 acquisitions is used to 
validate findings and conclusions. The thesis does not review the specific technology 
used by the Army's pilot program or the capabilities beyond on-line reverse auction. 
Chapter II: Background follows the introduction and provides background 
information for the following chapters. It reviews electronic commerce and reverse 
auction history, CECOM's initiative for the Army, competition, and price analysis 
techniques. 
Chapter III: Data Summary presents facts from three acquisitions in the form of 
mini-case narratives. Most of the data are in the form of interviews. A limited summary 
of critical metrics of 43 reverse auctions conducted through the ASFI is presented in 
tabular form. All of the acquisitions were accomplished using the initiative started by 
CECOM in the form of an on-line reverse auction strategy. The acquisitions provide 
insight to the use of reverse auction technology in a Government agency. 
Chapter IV: Analysis examines the data and indicates their implications. 
Deductive reasoning is employed in this interpretive chapter. Actual performances using 
a reverse auction strategy are compared to indicate a relationship. The comparative 
analysis results in common threads of successful execution. 
Chapter V: Conclusions and Recommendations draws the thesis together and 
presents logical conclusions. They are interpretations of the facts presented. Chapter V 
offers recommendations for future use of on-line reverse auctions and the expected 
benefits of the strategy. 
F.        EXPECTED BENEFITS OF THIS THESIS 
This thesis is intended to primarily benefit the United States Army acquisition 
community. Other Government agencies interested in the benefits of reverse auction 
strategies will benefit from the research as well. The critical review and analysis of the 
program will result in recommendations that will allow the acquisition professionals 
serving the Army to maximize the benefits of the program while recognizing the 
limitations of the program. 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a brief insight to acquisition reform and one innovative 
process derived from the commercial industry called on-line reverse auctioning. A 
discussion is presented that describes auctions and the many different formats. The thrust 
of this research is the reverse auction and the Army's application of the model. The 
implementation of auction techniques marks a transformation from a static pricing 
environment to a dynamic one. Dynamic pricing adds a new consideration to the 
Government pricing environment. 
B. BACKGROUND 
After the conflict in the Gulf, the Department of Defense (DOD) became the 
"billpayer" for striking budget reductions. Reductions affected the overall force structure 
numbers, military and civilian, as well as the defense budget. At the same time the 
Acquisition Reform initiative started gaining momentum. The 1994 Federal Acquisition 
Streamlining Act (FASA) and the 1996 Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA) made 
significant changes to the way Government does business. In the process of becoming 
better stewards of public funds, the acquisition community became innovative in its 
efforts to deal with a decreasing budget and resources. The Revolution in Business 
Affairs (RBA) is an effort by DOD to take advantage of the technology and management 
lessons found in world-class commercial companies that have maintained the U.S. 
leadership position in world commerce [Ref. 2]. 
Acquisition leaders actually put challenges before the community to innovate the 
acquisition processes. Everyone has heard the comment to do more with less. Less in 
today's era means fewer resources - financial and personnel. The commercial sector 
provides great access to emerging technologies and processes. The removal of statutory 
impediments and the ability to try new methods empowers the acquisition professionals 
to execute their missions in a new environment. 
In a statement before the Subcommittee on Government Management, 
Information and Technology, the former administrator for Federal Procurement Policy, 
Diedre A. Lee made the following statement. 
We must continue to look ahead -staying alert to changing commercial 
practices and conditions and new technologies - to identify additional 
reforms with substantial potential benefits. [Ref. 3] 
Clearly policy makers understand the importance of change. Highly successful 
corporations focus the workforce on key initiatives. Turning to the commercial sector can 
assist the Government in using new contracting tools to obtain up-to-date technology and 
better prices. [Ref. 3] 
Ms. Lee further highlighted the opportunities offered through electronic 
commerce. Electronic commerce will potentially redesign the buying process. In strategic 
terms, agencies must take aggressive action to capitalize on the commercial 
developments in electronic commerce technologies. The opportunities offered must be 
evaluated for use prior to blanket adoption. Obviously, ones with the greatest potential 
should be taken advantage of. 
The on-line reverse auction is a way for the acquisition community to adopt a 
successful practice from the commercial industry. On-line reverse auction capabilities are 
even more lucrative when you consider the Government is not the leader in this 
technology and would benefit from the technological transfusion of the process from 
commercial entities. There are three potential applications of the auction model in the 
public sector: procurement activities; disposition of used/surplus/seized assets; and 
internal management [Ref. 4]. Of these proposed applications, procurement activities by 
buying agencies are the focus of this thesis. In this realm, pricing is transformed from a 
static model into a dynamic one. Dynamic pricing is a "sophisticated term for 
environments where prices are not fixed." [Ref. 5] 
Procurement activities for goods and services by Government agencies has grown 
to over half a trillion dollars [Ref. 4]. The sheer numbers involved cause any cost 
reduction effort to be worthy of consideration. That is exactly what an on-line auction 
and dynamic pricing model attempt to accomplish. Agencies at all levels can benefit from 
the potential savings offered by the process. 
Tied to this buying effort are the technology advances with web-based auction 
models. O'Malley refers to the Web as a giant bidding war [Ref. 6]. On-line auctions are 
becoming the mainstream model in the world of business [Ref. 4]. The foundation is laid 
for the auction model to advance in today's time. Technologies such as the computer, 
Internet, and web-based applications are the catalysts for innovation in the procurement 
arena. 
In essence, the on-line reverse auction demonstrates the potential for cost and 
time savings. The efforts in the commercial industry with this technology deem it worthy 
of consideration in today's reform environment. Innovative processes such as on-line 
reverse auctions have the potential for orders of magnitude differences. 
C.       AUCTIONS 
1.        History 
The Webster's defines auction as "... sale in which property or items of merchandise are 
sold to the highest bidder" [Ref. 7] The etymology of the term is Latin, from augere, 
meaning to increase. Today, the increase refers to the escalating price offered for a good 
or service. 
Auctions date back to 500 B.C. The exact date and time of the first auctions are 
not exactly known. However, historians agree they have been in existence for quite some 
time. Fifth century Greeks auctioned mature women for marriage, but the Romans are 
believed to be the first to sell goods at an auction [Ref 8]. Auctions transitioned through 
the 1600s as mechanisms to sell books and arts by the British to means of raising funds to 
pay taxes and debts by early Americans in the 1700s. The 1800s introduced the slave 
market in the Western world to the auction arena. The Civil War provided the 
environment for auctions to be used as a means to sell seized property. Auctions 
remained in this type of use through the 1800s and into the first half of the 1900s [Ref. 9]. 
At the conclusion of World War II, businessmen seized an opportunity to develop 
the auction in a marketing manner. Private auctions stimulated the post war era. Goods 
and real estate auctions linked to banks, attorneys, accountants, court systems, 
Government agencies, and the public raised the reputation of auctions from its earlier 
marred status. [Ref. 9] 
A detractor to the previous auction model was the cost of time. To gain the 
advantage of dynamic pricing models the buyers and sellers had to be present in the same 
place and time. The advent of the Internet and the on-line auction mitigates the 
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inefficiencies by bringing the buyers and sellers together in cyberspace [Ref. 10]. The 
new auction model is creating a commerce market on the global scale. The Internet 
analyst firm Keenan Vision believes consumer and business on-line auctions will account 
for almost 30 percent of all electronic commerce by 2002 [Ref. 4]. 
Through time the auction has served the environment in which it was used well. 
The business model brings together the buyer and seller in a real time market place where 
personal elasticities are taken into account immediately. The resulting dynamic pricing 
ensures the laws of supply and demand in our capitalist society determine the rate paid. 
This is a very powerful model made even more useful by technology today. 
2.        Types of Auctions 
There are six major forms of auction used in the off-line and on-line environments 
[Ref. 4]. The most predominant are the: 1) English auction; 2) Yankee auction; 3) Dutch 
auction; 4) Traditional sealed bid auction; 5) Vickrey auction; and 6) the Reverse auction. 
The English auction is synonymous with ascending price. Bidding begins at a low price 
and as bidders compete, the price is driven higher. Bidders compete anonymously until 
the bid price is no longer raised. In this auction there is only one item available. 
The Yankee auction is a version of the English auction but multiple items are 
offered. The winners in the auction are ranked by their bids according to the highest bid 
price offered, the largest quantity bid, and then the earliest bid time. The Yankee auction 
offers participants the option of accepting a full or partial quantity. [Ref. 4] 
The Dutch auction introduces a variation to the standard auction format. The 
auction begins at a high starting price at which no one is believed to bid at. The bid price 
is reduced until bids are received. [Ref. 4] 
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A Traditional sealed bid auction is most similar to an acquisition strategy 
designed around an Invitation for Bids (IFB). Bidders remain anonymous and the high 
bid for an item on sale is the winner. If the item is for purchase, the low bid would win. 
[Ref. 4] 
The Vickrey auction provides for more strategy. In this auction the winner is the 
one who bids the highest bid. The winner only pays the amount bid by the next highest 
offer. The winner does not have to pay what he thought an item was worth, simply what 
the next person thought. This model may actually provide the most accurate market price 
for an item because it mitigates the "winner's curse." The "winner's curse" is defined as 
what people suffer when they "win" an auction by overestimating how much something 
is worth, therefore bidding too much. [Ref. 11] 
The Reverse auction is designed for a buyer. The buyer establishes the auction 
around a requirement. Suppliers bid anonymously to win the award and fill the 
requirement. Bidders submit bids in a descending price process. The winner is the one 
that submits the lowest bid. 
In the modern era a new term associated with auctions has come to the forefront. 
The Web auction is part of a dynamic commerce strategy that allows buyers and sellers to 
determine prices in real time on a per-transaction basis [Ref. 12]. A web auction strategy 
allows a company to optimize pricing and customer interactions. In this environment, 
prices vary in real time based on the current state of supply and demand. The Web 
auction incorporates customer price sensitivity into the model in an effort to create a 
more efficient market place. This environment affords a great opportunity. According to 
Hal Varian, "The Internet is the greatest medium in the history of economics for testing 
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all manner of hypotheses about which auctions work best under what circumstances." 
[Ref. 13] 
Lastly, the term private auction needs to be clarified. A private auction is one in 
which only a specific group of bidders or suppliers are allowed to compete. The privacy 
aspect allows the user to define exactly who will participate, or not participate. 
3.        Reverse Auctions 
What is a reverse auction? The simple answer is that it is the opposite of a more 
traditional auction. The traditional auction model involves a seller offering a good for 
sale and buyers competing with each other for the purchase. The price is bid higher by 
each successive offer until no one is willing to bid a higher price. In a reverse auction one 
buyer is offering his purchase for numerous sellers to bid for his patronage. The sellers 
successively bid the price down. Reverse auctions typically run for a pre-determined 
amount of time or until no one bids a lower price. Priceline.com is an example of a 
reverse auction. Reverse auction has been referred to as "unsealed bidding" and a lively 
price battle. 
Figure 2.1, derived from a graphic created by Denis Orsinger for Acquisition 
Solutions, portrays the differences between traditional auctions and reverse auctions. 
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TRADITIONAL AUCTION 
Items offered for sale 
Multiple buyers compete for 
the purchase 
Price is driven: 
REVERSE AUCTION 
Items required to be purchased 
Multiple sellers compete for 
the sale 
Price is driven: 
Figure 2.1       Auction Comparison [From Ref. 14] 
The reverse auction process is rather simple in nature and description. Most 
organizations conducting reverse auctions pre-screen the suppliers. The process may 
require large up front costs and the buyer is keen to receiving high quality products. 
Therefore, it is imperative to screen for established, responsible competitors [Ref. 14]. 
Pre-screening also allows organizations to restrict competition. Restricting the 
competition allows the buyer to limit the auction to sellers such as small business. 
Obviously, the opposite end of the spectrum could include industry leaders. 
Once sources are identified an on-line auction service conducts the process 
through a secure web site. Solicitations can be submitted electronically. Pre-registration 
ensures the sellers receive access to the site and training prior to the auction taking place. 
Sellers must agree to the terms of the auction prior to participation. Once the auction 
starts, bids are submitted anonymously. Alphanumeric characters are assigned to each 
vendor. On the auction site, only these characters appear. Thus, the vendor's true identity 
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remains unknown to other competitors. Bids can be submitted electronically directly to 
the site or via off-line vehicles such as a telephone line. The process does allow the 
contracting officer and other buying agency personnel to watch the auction from an 
independent workstation. At the conclusion of the predetermined time, the lowest bid is 
the winner. 
4.        Legality Issues 
The 1997 Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) rewrite removed language 
prohibited auctioning [Ref. 15]. The FAR council actually changed the language that had 
been in place for over 30 years. Agencies still have concerns over the legality of the 
auctions. A major concern stems from the basic descriptive differences between on-line 
reverse auctions and more traditional methods of procurement. Traditional methods such 
as sealed bidding, two-step sealed bidding, and negotiations are static pricing models. 
Reverse auctions are dynamic and open price battles [Ref. 14]. 
The concern deals with the Government revealing bid information of one bidder 
to another bidder. The legal consensus is that the practice is an acceptable process 
mitigated by the fact vendors must give their approval for the competition to see their 
prices during the auction. Be reminded, the vendor's identity remains anonymous 
throughout the process. Cost data are neither shared nor visible. 
The current thinking in the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) is to 
eliminate any existing FAR impediments to reverse auctioning. At the Reverse 
Auctioning Conference in August 2000 the general consensus was that the process is so 
new that the current approach is the most appropriate at this point in time. No one wants 
to issue guidance that will constrain innovation in this arena. 
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D.       ARMY REVERSE AUCTION 
1.        Background 
In May 2000, the Deputy Assistance Secretary of the Army for Acquisition and 
Logistics (AL&T), Kenneth J. Oscar challenged Army contracting activities to run 
reverse auctioning pilot programs [Ref. 16]. In October 2000, David C. Wyld prepared a 
grant report for PricewaterhouseCoopers Endowment for the Business of Government. 
The Wyld report and Oscar's challenge served as the impetus for the Army's auction 
model initiative. 
The program offers an opportunity to improve Government business practices. In 
an effort to expand its Interactive Business Opportunities Page (IBOP), the program 
represents the Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM) Acquisition Center's 
goal to make on-line acquisitions more efficient and cost effective. CECOM and its 
Electronic Reverse Auction Project Team (ERAPT) sought to reduce acquisition lead 
times in a "Best Value" decision rather than simply lowest priced products. As well, the 
program fulfills the mandate set forth in the Government Performance and Results Act 
(GPRA). This commercial industry practice has the potential to lower overall acquisition 
costs for services and supplies while maintaining a competitive environment. [Ref. 1] 
CECOM, located at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, answered Oscar's call. Shortly 
thereafter the command established the ERAPT. The team quickly established the process 
for an on-line reverse auction and conducted the Army's first such event on May 17, 
2000. The entire Army readily adopted the CECOM approach. The program gained 
attention from the United States Air Force and the United States Marine Corps. Both 
have joined the Army in their approach to the on-line auctioning model. [Ref. 1] The 
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Department of State, the Department of Energy, and the Department of Agriculture have 
all shown interest in conducting on-line reverse auction demonstrations using the 
CECOM model. Just recently the United States Navy has inquired about the model. 
CECOM's support contractor contracted with Frictionless Commerce, Inc. and 
Moai Technologies to tailor software applications to meet the specific needs of the new 
tool. However, Moai Technologies is no longer a partner in the arrangement. All software 
used comes from Frictionless Commerce Inc. The design is based around the Internet and 
web-based interfaces. This design allowed for integration into the Army Single Face to 
Industry (ASFI) website. The systems design also ensured instant interaction between the 
buyer and suppliers in an easy to use environment. Participants range from industry 
leaders to 8(a) businesses to both small and disadvantaged businesses. The AFSI website 
serves as a portal for the entire Army community to access and use the reverse auction 
function. The established contract includes a DOD wide license, which has allowed 
overseas units access to the model. Particularly important to savings potential, there are 
no transaction fees by a third party provider. [Ref. 17] 
It is important to point out the tool developed by CECOM consists of four distinct 
components. The components include a "Spidering" tool, "Reverse Auction" tool, 
Forward Auction Tool "A", and a Forward Auction Tool "B." The reverse auction tool is 
the focus of this research. [Ref. 1] 
2.        Initial Demonstrations 
CECOM began the pilot program with two immediate demonstration auctions. 
The first was conducted on May 17, 2000 and was a buy for a Ricoh Secure Fax System. 
The initial bid price was set at $6,891. The final bid and purchase price was $5,511. The 
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$1,380 decrease represented a savings of 20%. The second auction was for two IBM 
Thinkpad notebook computers (or equivalent). The initial bid price was established at 
$7,000 each. The final price paid was $3,280, or more than 50% savings [Ref. 18]. The 
initial trials showed great promise as an innovative process change [Ref. 1]. To date the 
CECOM on-line reverse auctioning tool has been used in 43 reverse auctions. Savings 
range from 0% to 53%. Total savings realized surpass $1.6 million in just one year of 
demonstration. 
Initial feedback from industry is promising. Comments refer to the ease in which 
the web site is navigable. Small and disadvantaged firms also give praise to the openness 
of the process. Some actually claim the process is fairer because of the openness. The 
openness obviates a perception that selecting an existing General Services Administration 
(GSA) schedule or other Government-wide contract vehicle is a "de facto" sole source 
acquisition by a requiring activity. The program provides suppliers with an easily 
acceptable source of business opportunities while maintaining a competitive environment 
while the Government obtains the best value for its customers. [Ref. 17] 
3.        Process 
On-line reverse auctioning is being referred to as an innovative change to the 
process of acquiring goods and services in the Government. Edward G. Elgart describes 
CECOM's approach to on-line reverse auctioning in the following quote. 
Reverse auctioning is a process whereby contracting officers enter specific 
product features, delivery dates, and warranties. Then a best value analysis 
is performed by weighing each feature's importance. This information is 
then posted to our web site, known as the Army Single Face to Industry 
Interactive Business Opportunities Page, along with the starting and 
ending date for the reverse auction. The prospective sellers offer their best 
price and, as other sellers post their best prices, sellers are permitted to 
reduce their original price thus defining "Reverse Auctioning." [Ref. 16] 
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The process begins with the identification of a need. The customer describes the 
need by specifying features or standards. Traditional acquisition strategies follow the 
same course. In the reverse auction strategy multiple avenues are available depending on 
the specific buy. In most cases vendors are screened prior to participation in the private 
auction. All vendors are registered in the Central Contractor Registration (CCR) 
database. CECOM has only used GSA vendors or its own contractors that already possess 
a Blanket Purchase Agreement (BPA) or Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) 
contract vehicle. In the instances where vendors are not screened prior to the auction or 
invited to participate, such as Sealed Bid procedures, the contracting officer conducts a 
pre-award survey upon completion of the auction but prior to award. This does not 
establish a competitive range because CECOM is allowing just about anyone to 
participate. Future enhancements to the model will allow for "Best Value" awards. [Ref. 
17] 
Solicitations occur in electronic and paper formats. The contracting officer has the 
discretion to determine the most appropriate medium. In Army buys thus far, the 
requirement has ranged from Military Specification (MILSPEC) items to Commercial 
Off The Shelf (COTS) items. However, no auctions for services have occurred. The date 
and time of the auction is publicized in order to allow ample time for vendors to register 
and receive training. Even though the model is web based and accessible from any 
computer with Internet access, minimum training is necessary for orientation to the 
interface semantics. 
The contracting officer establishes initial bid prices. Price analysis techniques 
assist the contracting officer with this process. In essence, the opening bid price 
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represents what the Government deems a fair and reasonable price. The dynamics of the 
auctioning model occur when the auction begins. 
The majority of reverse auctions conducted to date were designed for a 30-minute 
run time. However, latitude does exist to extend the auction based on bids received in the 
last minute. If a bid is received in the last five minutes, time is added to the run clock. 
Five-minute increments appear to be the norm. During the course of the auction vendors 
bid the price down based on their strategies for the competition. Any movement down on 
the price represents savings to the buying agency. 
Vendors do remain anonymous. Prior to the auction vendors receive passwords 
and training. On the web page vendors only see alphanumeric identifiers that represent 
the other vendors. These identifications are only visible once a vendor makes a bid. 
Precautions such as these preclude any FAR violation because only the contracting 
officer knows the identity of each vendor. 
Once the bidding ceases and time expires the auction is complete. At this point in 
time the contracting officer determines the award. Simplified acquisition procedures 
enhance the timeliness of award. However, at least seven of the auctions exceeded the 
Simplified Acquisition Threshold (SAT). In these cases award is more than a credit card 
transaction, but no more than traditional methods using fixed pricing techniques. 
The main difference between the Army's on-line reverse auction and traditional 
methods is the dynamic pricing environment present in the auctioning model. In essence, 
all other aspects of the acquisition are similar with slight variations caused by the web- 
based interface. 
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4.        Future 
After one year of demonstration and use the future of the Army program looks 
promising. The program has gained notoriety and recognition as a leader in the industry. 
Prime contractors have asked to use the tools for their subcontracts. Other Government 
Departments have approached Army representatives in an effort to observe the process 
and develop programs within their own organizations. On 7 June 2001, the CECOM 
Acquisition Center was awarded the "Department of Defense Best Electronic Commerce 
Team Award for 2001." The award recognized the program's work with small business in 
developing and maintaining the Army's unified E-Market and Reverse Auction Project. 
Government Executive has recognized CECOM's Electronic Reverse Auctioning Project 
as an example of innovation and creative business strategy. The program has been 
selected as a winner in the "2001 Business Solutions in the Public Interest" as a member 
of an elite group that showcases the finest acquisition practitioners in the Federal 
Government. [Ref. 17] 
E.       PRICING ENVIRONMENT 
1.        Definition 
An important role of the contracting officer is to conduct price analysis to ensure 
the Government purchases supplies and services from responsible sources at a fair and 
reasonable price. Any study of the pricing environment should begin with defining price. 
Two definitions of price come to the forefront in Government purchasing. First, most 
people think of price as the amount of money that a buyer pays a seller for the delivery of 
a product or the performance of a service [Ref. 19]. Second, FAR 15.401 defines price as 
cost plus any fee or profit applicable to the contract type [Ref. 20]. The emphasis here is 
on cost and fee or profit. Combining the two definitions results in price defined as the 
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amount the buyer pays for a product or service, with the understanding if the price does 
not cover expenses, a loss will occur [Ref. 19]. 
2.        Strategies 
An aspect of the pricing environment is the pricing strategies a seller may use. 
Basically, there are two approaches a seller may employ. First are cost-based pricing 
strategies that involve the analysis of the cost to produce a product and the addition of 
profit in determining the price. These strategies involve three techniques referred to as 
mark-up pricing, margin on direct cost, and rate-of-return pricing. The second category is 
market-based strategies that accomplish marketing objectives based on market 
conditions. These strategies consider the four "P"s of marketing: 1) price; 2) product; 3) 
place; 4) promotion. The techniques include profit-maximization pricing, market-share 
pricing, market skimming, current-revenue pricing, promotional pricing, demand- 
differential pricing, and market-competition pricing. [Ref. 19] 
Strategies are important to understand because they provide insight to the industry 
in which a buyer is engaging. Knowledge of a seller's motivation allows the buyer to 
customize his or her own purchasing strategy. Not all approaches work in every situation. 
Chapter IV provides more insight to the use of these strategies. 
The Contract Pricing Reference Guides (CPRG) provide further explanations of 
the strategies and techniques. Cost-based pricing is the establishment of prices based on 
estimated direct costs or total cost plus a percentage mark-up. This is a common 
technique in an industry where customers are expected to negotiate the price paid. The 
automobile industry uses cost-based pricing. [Ref. 19] 
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Margin pricing is similar to cost-based pricing except the model uses cost to 
establish a price that will result in a pre-established profit margin measured as a 
percentage of price. [Ref. 19] 
Rate-of-return pricing encourages the seller to calculate profit based on the 
financial investment required to provide the product, the return needed, and estimated 
sales volume. The calculated sales price includes the estimated price and desired profit. 
[Ref. 19] 
Profit-maximization pricing closely resembles the market economy. The seller 
assumes that demand will fall as prices increase and demand will grow as prices 
decrease. It is important for sellers using this technique to understand it is the least 
effective when competitors react rapidly to price changes. [Ref. 19] 
Market-share pricing is a technique used when prices are set low, even to the 
point of incurring a loss, in order to attract customers. As volume increases the losses 
eventually turn into long-term profits. In the business of major defense weapon systems a 
firm using this technique would be referred to as buying in. [Ref. 19] 
Market skimming is simply an approach to capture maximum profits on a low 
volume of sales. The seller demands a high price and sells to those buyers willing to pay 
the higher price. The perception here is that the buyer is buying the best product. The 
perceived best product may not always be the best value. [Ref. 19] 
Sellers more concerned about short-term business use current-revenue pricing. 
Financial despair may cause the seller to price in order to earn a smaller profit today 
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versus larger profits in the mid to long-term view. Market uncertainty as well as business 
financial instability are motivators for this type of pricing technique. [Ref. 19] 
Promotional pricing results in products being priced to encourage the sales of a 
product line. Individual profits are not as important as the overall product line profit. 
Bait-and-switch pricing, loss leader, and prestige pricing arrangements are types of 
promotional pricing. [Ref. 19] 
Demand-differential pricing is when the sellers demands different prices for the 
same goods simply based on differing market segments. The utilities companies are 
prime examples of this type of pricing. They charge a lower rate for electricity during off 
peak hours. [Ref. 19] 
Sellers often find themselves pricing products based on what the competition is 
doing or is expected to do. This method is Market-competition pricing. The gas price 
wars are examples of how the competition can affect a seller's pricing technique. [Ref. 
19] 
3.        Government Pricing Objective 
The primary pricing objective for Government purchases is to acquire supplies 
and services from responsible sources at fair and reasonable prices. In this context fair 
means fair to the buyer and seller. For the buyer, "fair" means fair market value or the 
cost incurred by a well-managed, responsible firm using reasonably efficient and 
economical methods of performance. "Fair" to the seller means the price is realistic in the 
sense the seller can perform and deliver under the terms and conditions of the contract. 
Market conditions influence the determination of reasonableness. A generic 
explanation of a reasonable price includes a price that a prudent and competent buyer 
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would be willing to pay. Conditions in the market make that determination a moving 
target. What is reasonable today may not be tomorrow. The law of demand drives much 
of the price determination. When the price goes up, the quantity demanded goes down 
[Ref. 21]. Conversely, the law of supply states that when the price goes up, the quantity 
supplied goes up [Ref. 21]. 
In the middle supply' and demand curves intersect and form the point of 
equilibrium. Depending on the market, the equilibrium changes constantly. The economic 
conditions, boom, recession, and depression affect available production capacity and thus 
establish the equilibrium point between supply and demand. This point changes, just as 
the reasonableness of a price changes. Figure 2.2 graphically presents this balance. 
Supply and Demand for output of the industry 
Price 
S = Supply 
D = Demand 
P0 = Equilibrium Price 
Q0 = Equilibrium Quantity 
Qo 
Quantity 
Figure 2.2       Supply versus Demand [From Ref. 21 ] 
The one factor that ensures the forces of supply and demand work is competition. 
When there is competition in the marketplace, the market sets the quantity demanded and 
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supplied. Price is simply a product of the laws of supply and demand. In competitive 
equilibrium, the industry automatically produces at the lowest possible total cost. [Ref 
Landsburg] The reverse auction process promotes competition. Ina Merson actually says 
it promotes the Cardinal Rule of Government procurement: Thou shall seek competition. 
[Ref Merson] 
4.        Price Analysis 
A tool used to determine if a price is fair and reasonable is the price analysis. The 
actual definition according to the FAR is the process of examining and evaluating a 
proposed price to determine if it is fair and reasonable, without evaluating its separate 
cost elements and proposed profit. Price analysis always involves some form of 
comparison. 
The CPRG also lists bases for comparison: 
Proposed prices received in response to a solicitation 
Commercial prices 
Previously proposed prices 
Parametric estimates 
Independent Government estimates 
Prices obtained through market research 
5.        Dynamic Pricing 
Up to now the discussion has oriented on static pricing models. Static models 
determine prices at a slower pace. Imagine a catalog with prices. Those prices were 
established under different conditions than the present market displays. Prices given are 
fixed or nearly inflexible. The auction model delivers a dynamic pricing model. 
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Dynamic pricing in the sense of auctions refers to an environment where prices 
are flexible. These environments put the power to set prices in the hands of the buyer. 
These models show the price markups have typically been in the 20% range versus 
traditional sales markups of 50% to 70% [Ref. 4]. This concept marks a change in the 
industry. The change is a shift in power from the marketing and sales departments to the 
buyer. From the buyers perspective there is a hierarchy in pricing. The following figure is 
adapted from OpenSite Technologies. 
Buyer's 
Advantage 
Figure 2.3       Pricing Hierarchy [From Ref. 4] 
On-line auctions provide an environment for dynamic pricing models to flourish. 
Depending on the market conditions there are four types of dynamic pricing models most 
prevalent in the on-line auction community today. The following figure portrays the 









Figure 2.4       Dynamic Pricing Models [From Ref. 4] 
The auction exhibits one seller and many buyers. In the haggle one buyer and 
seller bargain, or negotiate, to establish the price. Many buyers and sellers negotiate the 
price in the exchange. A reverse auction is an example of the bidding process where a 
buyer interacts with numerous sellers varying their prices. [Ref. 4] 
The basis for dynamic pricing is the price elasticity of demand [Ref. 4]. Price 
elasticity of demand for a good measures how sensitively the buyer's consumption of a 
good responds to a change in price [Ref. 21]. In this type of environment items can be 
priced at what the current, instantaneous market will bear. 
F.        SUMMARY 
Acquisition Reform is an enabler for process innovation. Coupled with statutory 
rewrites and a desire and requirement to improve, on-line auctioning models demonstrate 
the possibility to realize cost savings and reduce administrative burdens in the acquisition 
community. Chapter II provided background information concerning auctions, legal 
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issues associated with auctions, a description of the Army's initiative, and insight to 
Government pricing techniques and strategies. Chapter III represents a transition to 
presenting data from actual on-line reverse auction purchases. 
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III.    DATA SUMMARY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents data collected from periodicals and interviews with 
acquisition professionals that have been involved with the pilot program over the past 
year. The on-line reverse auction process is still evolving and this chapter presents a snap 
shot of insights from the users. In order to create a pattern in the presentation, each of the 
three cases follows a repetitive format. The discussion includes: a description of the items 
acquired; the quantities involved in the acquisition; initial and final bid prices; factors 
associated with time; and the number of vendors participating. The last piece of data 
presented is a table of all reverse auctions conducted through the ASFI. A common factor 
in each of the three cases is the choice to use a private reverse auction, where competitors 
require passwords to gain access to the bidding arena. This feature allows the contracting 
officer to ensure only responsible and responsive bidders participate. 
B. CASE 1 
CECOM conducted a reverse auction as a test case. They chose to use a spare 
parts replenishment item with a historical background of acquisition as its candidate. The 
reverse auction was conducted on July 25, 2000. This was one of the earliest auctions 
conducted through the CECOM initiative. Many of the procedures established over time 
benefited from this event. One of the prominent lessons learned centered around the 
auction time span and termination procedures. 
1.        Description 
The item acquired was an electrical connector plug, NSN 5935-01-236-3117. The 
plug is part of a power control cable for a 30 Kw/400 Hz generator Power Distribution 
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Unit (PDU). The PDU is a component of the Patriot system. The item is designed to a 
military specification (MILSPEC). A complete drawing package existed and dictated the 
design of the item. This was a standard design and low risk item to procure. The 
MILSPEC design did not limit competition in the past or in this acquisition. The 
acquisition was determined to be a Lowest Priced Technically Acceptable (LPTA) action. 
[Ref. 22] 
2. Quantity 
The acquisition was in response to a replenishment need. The number was set at 
100 units. The acquisition history included three previous buys. Pins were acquired in 
1991, 1998, and 1999 in quantities of 406, 30, and 60 respectively. Nothing led the 
researcher to believe the quantities were dictated by anything other than demand for 
stockage levels. Obviously, demand for replenishment was much higher in the time 
period surrounding Operations Desert Shield and Storm when Patriot systems were in 
high demand. [Ref. 22] 
3. Opening/Final Bid Price 
Prices previously paid for this item were used by the Government to estimate a 
fair and reasonable price. The Government estimate was used to establish an opening bid 
price of $1,180 per unit. The estimate for the total acquisition was $118,000 ($1,180 x 
100). The final bid offered was $780. Because this was a LPTA designed acquisition, the 
lowest bidder received the award. The total acquisition cost $78,000 ($780 x 100). 
4. Time Period for Auction 
Figure 3.1 is a graphical representation of the bidding process during the reverse 
auction. Unfortunately, the bid history was not available for this auction. This was one of 
the earliest reverse auctions conducted through the CECOM site. One lesson learned was 
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to capture the bidding history data for future use. The auction commenced at 1:30 PM 
and was designed to last 30 minutes. Ten five-minute extensions were enacted because 
bids were received in the last five minutes. [Ref. 23] 
The researcher has attempted to portray the bid history graphically with the use of 
only the opening and final bids. The graph indicates the reduction in price by the 
downward sloping line over a period of 80 minutes with a decrease in price from $1180 
to $780 ($-400) during the period. 
$1,300 




Figure 3.1       CECOM Reverse Auction [After Ref. 23] 
5.        Vendors 
Two competitors participated in this reverse auction. Efforts to ensure 
competition followed the route of traditional sealed bid techniques. The solicitation was 
announced in the Commerce Business Daily (CBD) and on the CECOM IBOP. The 
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success in the past with acquiring this item eased any concerns with competition. 
However, the use of technology was new to the vendors and required training prior to the 
auction. On-line reverse auctioning was very new a year ago and few vendors were 
familiar with it. 
6.        Time Issues 
As one of the earliest tests of the Army's reverse auction initiative, training was 
imperative  to  success.  In  essence, the procedure  mirrored traditional  sealed bid 
techniques. Two factors stand out as contrasts though. First, there was a learning curve 
for the vendors. Because it was a new process, the vendors had to be reminded to sign up 
for passwords. As the process becomes more commonplace the need for reminders and 
training will decrease. A second issue involved the process of submitting bids. This 
reverse auction was designed to last for 30-minutes. One vendor submitted a bid so close 
to the end time it was not processed through the Internet and server in a timely manner. 
The vendor was not awarded the contract and submitted a protest based on the 
submission of his late bid. The protest was withdrawn before any action took place on the 
protest. There is an analogy between the delivery of a bid through the Internet and the 
delivery of a bid through the mail system. Ultimately, the bidder is responsible for the 
prompt delivery of his bid. [Ref. 22] 
C.       CASE 2 
The III Corps and Fort Hood, Texas Contracting Command conducted the second 
reverse auction analyzed in this thesis. The command supports III Corps and tenant units 
located at Fort Hood, Texas, Fort Bliss, Texas, Fort Carson, Colorado, and Fort Riley, 
Kansas. The command was the first United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) 
unit to attempt an on-line reverse auction. The initiative was directed in FORSCOM 
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guidance on the pilot program in response to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the 
Army's request for FORSCOM to run a test before the year-end [Ref. 24]. 
1.        Description 
On August 29,2000 the III Corps Contracting Command conducted FORSCOM's 
first ever, on-line reverse auction [Ref. 25]. The local Aviation-Missile Command 
(AMCOM) OLR Project Team submitted a request for the command to procure 40 
computer systems. The request identified the minimum characteristics as mid-tower, 
Pentium III 650 MHz Central Processing Units (CPU), or compatible, with 128 megabyte 
(MB) of Random Access Memory (RAM), 8-gigabyte (GB) hard drive, 16 MB video 
card, 250 MB Zip drive, keyboard, an optical mouse. The request also stipulated 
compatibility with on hand equipment such as disk drives, network interface cards, 
monitors and printers. No other special requirements were identified in the purchase 
request. The acquisition strategy centered on awarding based on the LPTA. [Ref. 26] 
Market research conducted by the contracting office revealed the minimum stated 
requirements were below current technology standards. Several CPUs were identified 
which had faster processing speeds and larger hard drive storage capability. The risk for 
this acquisition was low because the item resembled a Commercial Off The Shelf 
(COTS) item and did not demand the latest technology advances. [Ref. 26] 
Review of the above requirement by the contracting office revealed no reference 
to a quality standard such as warranty period or "Service after the Sale." Nor did the 
requirements stipulate a minimum industry standard such as Tier I or II manufacturing. 
These characteristics are commonly found in the commercial industry. Follow up 
communications with the user clarified this issue with the user. Based on the contract 
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specialist's recommendation to the user the requirements document was changed to 
include a 3-year warranty. The warranty accounted for 1st year on site parts and labor and 
2nd and 3rd year parts and labor. As well, the salient characteristics of the system 
mandated manufacturing by a Tier I or II manufacturer. [Ref. 26] 
2. Quantity 
The customer dictated the requirement for 40 systems in the purchase request. In 
an after action comment the contracting specialist noted the prospective contractors did 
not have a problem with the requirement. Market research led the buyers to believe larger 
quantities were more conducive to realizing greater production efficiencies and savings. 
The contracting command did not exercise influence in determining the number of units 
purchased because the customer only needed 40 units. [Ref. 26] 
3. Opening/Final Bid Price 
The customer conducted market research in order to estimate a unit price. The 
market research focused on pricing separate components included in the CPU. In the 
computer industry this is a common practice. The component prices were added together 
to derive the cumulative price. The user added an additional 20% to account for 
assembly, shipping, and handling. The contracting specialist verified this price estimate 
by conducting a separate market research effort. The price estimate created by the user 
and verified by the contracting specialist was $1500 per unit. The total estimated cost for 
the entire acquisition was $60,000 ($1,500 x 40). [Ref. 26] 
Twelve bids were issued from three different companies during the course of the 
reverse auction. The final and accepted reverse auction bid was $1340. The total 
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acquisition cost was $53,600 ($1,340 x 40). The lowest bidder was awarded the contract 
at the $1,340 price. 
4.        Time Period for Auction 
Thirty minutes was allotted for the reverse auction. The command thought 30 
minutes was a sufficient amount of time for vendors to bid the price down to the lowest 
price and still sustain a fair profit. However, the reverse auction did allow for extensions. 
If a bid was submitted in the last five minutes of the auction, an additional five minutes of 
time was added to the auction commencing at the time of the bid. No rules established the 
end of the auction because extensions were granted past the 30-minute period. A period 
of five-minute inactivity since the last bid would terminate the auction if the total elapsed 
time exceeded 30 minutes. The rationale for this feature is to preclude the winner from 
being the last person to submit a bid versus the lowest bid available. Thirty minutes 
reverse auctions with five-minute extensions has turned into the standard allotment for 
on-line reverse auctions conducted through the CECOM ASFI. 
In this case, two bids were received in the latter portion of the time frame and 
caused the auction to extend past the 30-minute period. The auction terminated after five 
minutes of inactivity after the last bid. This auction lasted a total of 32 minutes. 
Figure 3.2 graphically displays the bid price over time. The downward sloping 
line indicates a lowering of the bid amount. The opening bid of $1,500 is the first point 
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Figure 3.2       Fort Hood Reverse Auction [After Ref. 23] 
5.        Vendors 
Five vendors were chosen among the existing GSA schedule that supplies 
computer equipment. The command chose to use this purchase as a small business set- 
aside. In order to keep the playing field level, all vendors chosen were classified as a 
small or small disadvantaged business. Initial contacts with the vendors were used to 
recruit participation in the on-line reverse auction process. One of the vendors did not 
respond to inquiries. A second vendor was interested in the process, but chose not to 
participate once the initial bid price was established because the price was below his 
lowest available price. Therefore, a total of three vendors participated in the competition. 
[Ref. 26] 
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6.        Time Issues 
The requirement was received by the contracting command on 23 August 2000. 
The contracting office took six days preparing for the reverse auction. The majority of 
this time was used for market research and for communications with the customer. Upon 
completion of the reverse auction the contracting officer reviewed a specification sheet 
from the "winner" to ensure compliance with the stated requirements. In this case, the 
"winner" provided a product that exceeded the minimum salient requirements. 
Specifically, the CPU was rated at 733 Mhz and the hard drive capacity measured 15 GB. 
The contract was awarded on the same day of the reverse auction using DD Form 1155. 
Debriefings by the contracting officer occurred the day after the reverse auction. The 
remaining contractual actions were estimated to take five working days to complete. 
Twelve days were required to process and complete this acquisition. Using GSA vendors 
precluded CCR registration verification. [Ref. 26] 
D.       CASE 3 
The United States Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) 
procures supplies in an effort to support the various programs under its purview. A 
common component such as brake pads requires acquisition at staggered intervals 
depending on inventory on-hand and demand. In December 2000, the TACOM chose to 
use the reverse auction initiative to fill a brake pad replenishment requirement. 
1.        Description 4 
The items being acquired were brake pads, NSN 2530-00-602-5738. These pads 
were acquired as replacement parts for use on tracked vehicles. The pads were 
completely described in a Military Technical Data Package categorized as complete by 
the TACOM Engineering Business Center. The data package fully defined the product 
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through specifications and drawings. The brake pads represent the opposite end of the 
description spectrum. [Ref. 27] 
Demand for the brake pads began in 1982, the first year of acquisition for this 
specific supply. The acquisitions continued annually through 1986. The late 80's and 90's 
marked a period of no acquisitions for this item. After a 12-year hiatus the requirement 
surfaced again in 1998. Since then, the pads have been bought annually in reduced 
quantities. [Ref. 27] 
2.        Quantity 
The item manager established the quantity for acquisition. Replacement part 
orders are derived from inventory requirements and predicted usage. Quantities wee 
dictated by the requirements determination process. Economic Order Quantities (EOQ) 
are always a potential factor, but they must be balanced against other factors such as 
holding costs. In this case, the buyer did not influence the quantity purchased, but simply 
responded to the customer's request. In 1999 the year's buy totaled 298. The acquisition 
in 2000 was for a quantity of 140. The reduction is over 50% from the previous year. 
[Ref. 27] 
3.        Opening/Final Bid Price 
Previous purchases for the same requirement provided a base for estimating 
prices. The item has not changed over time. The design is the same as earlier buys. The 
historical prices and the price paid in 1999 served as the basis for establishing the 
opening bid price of $815. Review of the purchase did not indicate market research led to 
any revision of the price estimate. As well, personnel turnover in the office did not allow 
40 
further insight to the price analysis. The total estimated cost of the acquisition was 
$111,300 ($795x140). 
During the course of a planned 30-minute reverse auction ten bids were 
submitted. At the conclusion of the event, and when no bidder chose to submit a lower 
bid, the final bid was established at $700. The contract was awarded to the lowest bidder 
at the $700 price. Total acquisition cost was $98,000 ($700 x 140). 
4. Time Period for Auction 
The auction was planned for 30-minutes. The terms of the auction included a 
provision for a five-minute extension if a bid was received in the last five minutes of the 
auction. As well, an inactive period of five minutes after the minimum auction period 
elapsed would terminate the auction. This process was previously described. 
Figure 3.3 portrays the dynamic pricing as it occurred during the reverse auction. 
The maximum bid price of $815 is the first point plotted on the left side of the graph. The 
final bid price of $700 is the final plot. The figure graphically displays the lowering of 
the bid price over time. 
5. Vendors 
The contracting officer solicited four previous suppliers of the item based on their 
performance and standing. The first vendor was described as an "excellent" contractor. 
Problems were referenced in another, but waivers were in place and the contractor had 
produced before. The third vendor was technically good, but occasionally slow to deliver. 
The last vendor was simply described as good. All four vendors were classified as small 
businesses. Capability had been demonstrated before and the contracting officer thought 
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they were good candidates. It is important to remember GSA vendors were used in the 
process. [Ref. 28] 
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Figure 3.3 TACOM Reverse Auction [After Ref. 27] 
Of the four, only three vendors chose to participate in the reverse auction on the 
day of the event. TACOM chose to use this acquisition as a set aside for award to a small 
business. Even though the item was built with a MILSPEC there was ample competition 
in the small business arena. In previous acquisitions for this item through sealed bid 
methods the competition surrounded around three to four competitors. The technology 
did not appear to cause concern for bidders. 
6.        Time Issues 
No special process was created to notify the competitors of the solicitation. 
However, the buyer sent e-mail messages to all previous suppliers of the item and all 
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sources suggested by the TACOM Small Business Office to notify them of the on-line 
reverse auction. The purpose of the e-mail messages was to announce the solicitation 
appearance on TACOM's web page. Contracting personnel did not note any significant 
difference in time associated with the acquisition effort. The Indefinite 
Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contract in place allows streamlining in the process 
after award. [Ref. 27] 
One difference from the traditional sealed bid method employed in past buys was 
the need for training. The contracting officer ensured each vendor was in contact with the 
reverse auction administrator prior to the event for hands on training. The training 
resembled a reverse auction and allowed the vendors to practice making bids and get 
accustomed to the "buttonology." 
E.       CONSOLIDATED REVERSE AUCTION DATA 
In just under one year CECOM's reverse auction initiative has served as the 
foundation for 43 on-line reverse auctions conducted by the United States Army, United 
States Air Force, and the United States Marine Corps. Table 3.1 presents pertinent data 
from these acquisitions. Acquisition users around the globe have experienced the web 
based reverse auction tool through the ASFI. The Internet has not only provided a 
seamless environment for the user community, but the suppliers as well. 
Item descriptions range from common products such as livestock (goats) and 
lumber to sophisticated products like secure fax machines and computers. The range of 
products spans a spectrum of commodities from COTS to Military Specification 
(MILSPEC). 
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Quantities acquired range from single units to the hundreds. In some instances 
acquisitions were for lots. Lots should not be confused with single items because most 
lots totaled tens and hundreds of items. The size of the acquisition did not affect the 
ability to conduct a reverse auction process. However, Chapter IV will analyze the affect 
of small quantities on the success of achieving savings through the reverse auction 
process. 
The number of vendors participating in any particular reverse auction ranges from 
one to nine. More competition causes the forces of the market economy to operate 
effectively. The on-line reverse auction environment serves as a dynamic environment 
based on real time changes in the market economy. Chapter IV will analyze this 
relationship examining the number of competitors and perceived success in achieving 
savings. 
Finally, Table 3.1 presents opening bid prices and final bid prices for the 30 
acquisitions. Data can be extrapolated to show the savings achieved measured against the 
price determined to be fair and reasonable prior to the reverse auction. Each action is 
surrounded in peculiarities specific to its case that are not presented in the table. 
However, over the course of 43 acquisitions trends and outcomes can be observed and 
measured. 
Table 3.2 is similar to Table 3.1. However, the individual bid prices are extended 
for the total acquisition. In the cases of lots, the extended bid price is the same as the 
individual bid price. The extended bid prices portray the potential for order of magnitude 
differences using the reverse auction dynamic pricing model. 
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Product Qty Opening Bid Award Bid # Vendors 
Secure Fax Machines 1 $6,891 $5,511 2 
Laptops 2 $7,000 $3,280 3 
Fax Machines 5 $500 $440 2 
Electrical Connector Plugs 100 $1,180 $780 2 
Computers 733 MHz 20 $2,300 $1,850 5 
Computers 800 MHz 135 $1,900 $1,300 5 
Computers 800 MHz 10 $4,100 $2,490 6 
Computers 140 $1,900 $1,470 4 
Computers 40 $1,500 $1,340 4 
Computers 866 MHz 520 $1,550 $1,120 6 
Photo Workshop 1 $7,000 $7,000 1 
Color Printer 16 $4,500 $3,800 3 
Computers 197 $1,700 $1,400 6 
Lumber 1 $17,000 $15,400 3 
Multipurpose Paper 1 Lot (880) $22,500 $19,700 3 
Overhead Projector 1 $4,100 $3,300 4 
Goats 100 $130 $100 5 
PC Card 1 $12,200 $7,600 5 
Zip Drives 1 Lot (30) $4,950 $3,900 3 
Dishwashers 1 Lot (100) $22,000 $15,700 8 
Hot Water Heaters 1 Lot (100) $20,000 $12,200 6 
Brake Link 140 $815 $700 3 
Tool Kits 100 $900 $895 5 
Collar Assembly part 1 Lot (35) $145,425 $121,500 7 
Hydraulic Wrench 308 $1,410 $1,410 1 
Office supplies 1 Lot (160) $10,000 $6,000 9 
Link Assembly part 1 Lot (54) $207,900 $149,000 3 
Supplemental Armor 87 $490 $442 3 
Dishwashers, Ranges, Refrigerators 1 Lot (90) $31,000 $23,300 3 
Computer Hardware 1 Lot (278) $500,000 $368,008 3 
Desktop Computers 27 $1,700 $1,600 2 
Grenade Launcher 1 $11,500 $10,990 3 
DVD & Camcorder 1 Lot (2) $8,200 $7,800 3 
Notebook Computers 40 $4,650 $2,700 6 
Hardware for Messaging System lLot $230,000 $138,850 3 
Desktop Computers 1 Lot (60) $147,000 $118,000 7 
Appliances lLot $42,000 $33,600 3 
Desktop Computers 1 Lot (109) 197,000 $115,000 6 
Paper 1 Lot (10) $43,000 $37,328 8 
Sun Equipment 1 Lot $1,847,000 $1,717,500 9 
Sun Microsystems lLot $1,052,000 $959,000 4 
Eyepiece Assembly 1 Lot $550,000 $261,500 2 
Modular Office Buildings 1 $24,000.00 $17,400 3 
Table 3.1        Total Reverse Auction [After Ref. 17] 
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Product TJty Extended Price Extended Price Start Complete 
Secure Fax Machines 1 $6,891 $5,511 
Laptops 2 $14,000 $6,560 
Fax Machines 5 $2,500 $2,200 
Electrical Connector Plugs 100 $118,000 $78,000 
Computers 733 MHz 20 $46,000 $37,000 
Computers 800 MHz 135 $256,500 $175,500 
Computers 800 MHz 10 $41,000 $24,900 
Computers 140 $266,000 $205,800 
Computers 40 $60,000 $53,600 
Computers 866 MHz 520 $806,000 $582,400 
Photo Workshop 1 $7,000 $7,000 
Color Printer 16 $72,000 $60,800 
Computers 197 $334,900 $275,800 
Lumber 1 $17,000 $15,400 
Multipurpose Paper 1 Lot (880) $22,500 $19,700 
Overhead Projector 1 $4,100 $3,300 
Goats 100 $13,000 $10,000 
PC Card 1 $12,200 $7,600 
Zip Drives 1 Lot (30) $4,950 $3,900 
Dishwashers 1 Lot (100) $22,000   ■ $15,700 
Hot Water Heaters 1 Lot (100) $20,000 $12,200 
Brake Link 140 $114,100 $98,000 
Tool Kits 100 $90,000 $89,500 
Collar Assembly part 1 Lot (35) $145,425 $121,500 
Hydraulic Wrench 308 $434,280 $434,280 
Office supplies 1 Lot (160) $10,000 $6,000 
Link Assembly part 1 Lot (54) $207,900 $149,000 
Supplemental Armor 87 $42,630 $38,454 
Dishwashers, Ranges, Refrigerators 1 Lot (90) $31,000 $23,300 
Computer Hardware 1 Lot (278) $500,000 $368,008 
Desktop Computers 27 $45,900 $43,200 
Grenade Launcher 1 $11,500 $10,990 
DVD & Camcorder 1 Lot (2) $8,200 $7,800 
Notebook Computers 40 $186,000 $108,000 
Hardware for Messaging System lLot $230,000 $138,850 
Desktop Computers 1 Lot (60) $147,000 $118,000 
Appliances 1 Lot $42,000 $33,600 
Desktop Computers 1 Lot (109) $197,000 $115,000 
Paper 1 Lot (10) $43,000 $37,328 
Sun Equipment lLot $1,847,000 $1,717,500 
Sun Microsystems 1 Lot $1,052,000 $959,000 
Eyepiece Assembly lLot $550,000 $261,500 
Modular Office Buildings 1 $24,000 $17,400 
Table 3.2        Extended Prices [After Ref. 17] 
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F.        SUMMARY 
This chapter presented three cases and a compilation of auctions to date in which 
contracting agencies used the Army's reverse auction initiative to acquire supplies. 
CECOM and TACOM acquired replenishment items manufactured to a MILSPEC while 
Fort Hood acquired commercial standard computers. The items acquired varied from 
generic to those with specific military functions. In all but two cases the maximum bid 
price was higher than the final bid price. The movement on the price indicates the 
potential for savings. Competition appears to be a driving factor in the reverse auction 
model. In each of the three cases presented, competition was present even though the 
auctions were limited to small businesses. 
Credit must be given to the personnel making the choice to try new innovative 
techniques and make the process work better. Early attempts forged the way for progress 
because their lessons learned have benefited the process. Lessons learned pertaining to 
vendor recruitment and auction time periods have developed into standards within the 
process. 
Chapter IV will constitute the analysis of the data presented in Chapter III. The 
trends between these data can serve as the basis for inferences about the effectiveness and 
usefulness of on-line reverse auctions in the future of acquisition. 
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IV.    ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the results of the research and the analysis of the data 
presented in the previous chapter. The focus for the analysis was two fold. The focus 
includes identifying common threads and trends in the data and actually measuring the 
savings incurred. After analyzing the data the researcher determined six areas existed 
which warranted discussion. The areas include: 1) Item Description; 2) Quantity; 3) 
Maximum Bid Determination; 4) Time; 5) Competition; and 6) Savings. Structuring the 
analysis around these topic areas provided a basis for discussion and means to compare 
performance. 
B. ITEM DESCRIPTION 
The items acquired through the reverse auctions are characterized as Commercial 
Off The Shelf (COTS). Many of these items are definitively COTS because the industry, 
not the Government, determines the standards to which they are built and sold to the 
general public. However, some items are Military Specification (MILSPEC), built to a 
technical data package standard. Specifically, the brake shoe link and connector pin 
reverse auctions acquired items designed and built to a MILSPEC. It is important to point 
out that the items were previously acquired and the reverse auction did not represent an 
acquisition for a new requirement. At least seven of the items acquired are military 
unique, for a military requirement. In essence, the items acquired span the continuum 
from COTS to MILSPEC. This continuum not only accommodates the design character, 
but also the usability aspect of the item. While the items may be characterized as COTS, 
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the end use is also of a generic nature not necessarily military in nature. For instance, the 
computers acquired are most likely used in offices in the garrison environment. 
A key characterization of the items acquired is that they were all goods. Services 
were not acquired in any of the auctions. The transition in the past few years to more than 
50% of dollars spent for the acquisition of services makes this a prime target for future 
reverse auction uses. 
The analysis appears to indicate there are four general categories of items 
acquired through the Army's reverse auction. These four categories are created from 
making inferences from generic item nomenclatures. The list includes: 
• Military in nature 






















Figure 4.1       Item Categories 
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The military in nature category includes those items using a MILSPEC design or 
items whose end use is for a military end item not found in commercial use. This 
category includes items such as supplemental armor, the brake shoe, specific parts, the 
grenade launcher and such. 
The second category is ADPE. These items are easy to identify. They include 
items such as laptop and desktop computers, fax machines, printers, overhead projectors, 
and other computer hardware. 
The third category is appliances. Appliances include dishwashers, hot water 
heaters, ranges, and refrigerators. 
The last category is a generic consolidation of items that do not clearly fit into one 
of the other categories. The list of items here includes lumber, buildings, animals, office 
supplies, and tool kits. 
C.       QUANTITY 
The quantity of items acquired using a reverse auction spans a spectrum of a 
single item to hundreds of items. The single item acquisitions were mostly 
demonstrations early in the pilot program. On the other end of the spectrum high quantity 
acquisitions accounted for the majority of buys. In one instance, 520 servers were 
acquired in one buy. 
In the three  cases reviewed, the quantities were determined by a single 
requirement. The data pertaining to the remaining reverse auctions do not provide any 
insight as to whether the quantities acquired were consolidated requirements or single 
requirements.  Obviously,  greater savings would be realized if requirements were 
combined. 
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Early in the program the actual number of items defined quantities. Towards the 
end of 2000 the quantities began to be listed as Lots of specific quantities. Overall, this 
has no bearing on the buy unless the auction stipulates all or none. None of the auctions 
conducted to date have split the acquisition between vendors. At least one contracting 
officer chose to structure the solicitation in a way to preserve the right to adjust 
quantities. In this instance, the quantity could fluctuate up or down by 20% but at the 
final reverse auction price [Ref. 29]. 
D. MAXIMUM BID DETERMINATION 
In the three cases reviewed, each agency conducted an Independent Government 
Estimate (IGE) during the price analysis process. Two of the agencies used previous 
prices paid as the base for comparison. The third agency used a customer price analysis 
along with the contracting specialist's independent market research to compare prices. 
In each case the price analysis determined a fair and reasonable price for the item. 
This is important because this price serves as the basis to measure dollar savings. This 
price is what the agency would have been willing to pay for the item. In two instances, 
the maximum bid was the final bid price offered. Price analysis is still an important step 
in the process because it determines the starting point for all bid decrements. 
E. TIME 
The personnel involved in all three cases reviewed referred to the reverse auction 
procedure as similar to a sealed bid process. Using GSA vendors reduced the timeline for 
acquisitions. The major differences between a traditional method and on-line reverse 
auctioning include time for vendor training and the dynamic period of price 
determination. 
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The researcher believes time necessary to recruit vendors and train vendors will 
eventually decrease. A year ago the process was too new and the experience level was 
low. In time, more vendors will become exposed to E-Commerce processes and the 
comfort level will increase. 
However, it is hard to determine how much effort is required to ensure 
competition. One contracting specialist actually sent letters to vendors in order to recruit 
participation. This was one of the early acquisitions. It cannot be determined from the 
research conducted whether this much proactive support from the contracting agency is 
necessary at this time. 
Thirty minutes with five-minute extensions has developed as the standard time 
allotted for a reverse auction. The five-minute extension is an adaptation that will prevent 
any last second bid submission game play. The intent for a time period is to allow all 
bidders the opportunity to participate in a timely manner. The extension ensures each 
bidder has the opportunity to assess the previous bid and determine whether or not they 
want to submit a new bid. This also represents the evolution of the reverse auction from 
an electronic bulletin board type media where bids were posted over the course of days to 
a compacted and dynamic period of time measured in minutes. 
In each of the three cases reviewed there was no conclusive data captured that 
allowed analysis 'of time savings. General statements comparing the reverse auction 
process to a sealed bid method did not allow direct comparison of the effort required. 
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F.        COMPETITION 
1.        General Observations 
There is one rule that the data overwhelmingly enforces. Without competition 
there is little opportunity for monetary savings. In the two cases in which only one vendor 
participated in the reverse auction the final bid was the maximum bid determined prior to 
the reverse auction. The savings in those cases was $0, resulting in no monetary savings. 
In the other reverse auctions the number of vendors participating ranged from two 
to nine. The mean number of competitors is four. Figure 4.1 presents the level of 
competition in each reverse auction. The number of competitors is plotted against the 
auction number. There appears to be no direct relationship between the number of 
vendors participating and the amount of savings realized. Figure 4.2 is a scatter plot 
graph. The savings realized is on the vertical axis and the number of competitors is on the 
horizontal axis.  The figure presents a range of savings at each different level of 
competition. The type of item, industry, and current market conditions appear to 
determine the amount of savings. This research did not allude to the type of pricing 
strategies used in the different industries. The underlying premise remains that the 
reverse auction is a dynamic pricing environment that acknowledges the current market 
conditions (supply vs. demand) when determining price. 
A timely example of this occurred in May 2001 when Dell chose to price their 
computers on a market share strategy. The timing and dynamics of a reverse auction 
allowed buyers to realize savings based on the current market. The reverse auction 
appeared to have capitalized on economic trends at the time of the auction. [Ref. 30] 
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2.        Types of Vendors 
In two of the cases reviewed the reverse auctions were limited to small business 
concerns. The contracting agency was able to establish the buy as a small business set- 
aside. Industry leaders such as Micron, Dell, and Gateway participated in other reverse 
auctions for computers. A spectrum exists that spans from the small business owner to 
the industry leaders. The reverse auction provides the flexibility for the contracting 
officer to meet different goals such as small business set-asides. 
G.       SAVINGS 
The true savings realized in using a reverse auction strategy is in the form of 
dollars returned to the command. The monetary savings is easy to compute using the 
maximum bid and the final (award) bid. The difference between the two is the savings 
realized for that particular acquisition. The underlying premise is that the customer would 
buy the item at the maximum bid price. This concept refers to the customer's utility for 
the item at a particular point in time. Utility "...measures how much pleasure or 
satisfaction..." is derived from owning a particular basket of goods [Ref. 21]. 
Table 4.1 is a compilation of all the reverse auctions conducted through the ASFI 
to date. The "Total Dollars Saved" column represents the difference between the 
maximum bid price and the final award bid price extended for the entire acquisition. The 
"% Saved" column is derived by dividing the total dollars saved by the extended 
maximum bid price for the acquisition. The auctions are arranged in order of savings 
realized, high to low. 
High dollar acquisitions provide the opportunity for high dollar savings. The true 
power of the reverse auction would be realized if requirements were combined into single 
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auctions. The economies of scale would allow the vendors more ability to lower the price. 
The researcher was unable to conclude if requirements were combined. In the three cases 
reviewed it was known requirements were not combined. Obviously, specific buys may 
not lend themselves to larger numbers. Generic acquisitions, such as computers, provide 
greater opportunity for combining requirements. 
The arithmetic mean of the reverse auction savings was 21.83%. The mean is 
simply the average savings of the 43 reverse auctions reviewed. Another way to analyze 
the savings is to measure the dollars saved. The total dollars saved for the reverse 
auctions totaled $1,606,395. This value translates to an overall savings of 19.82%. 
H.       SUMMARY 
The most convincing data reviewed during the research stems from the savings 
realized by pursuing a reverse auction strategy. Without a doubt, in these acquisitions the 
reverse auction provided savings. What the data do not present is a comparison of prices 
paid through a reverse auction and prices paid through traditional methods. One cannot 
conclude the reverse auction provides more or fewer savings, but simply that it does 
provide a savings compared to the price deemed fair and reasonable. 
The reverse auction is also characterized as flexible. Agencies were able to limit 
the acquisitions to small businesses or open the competition to the full spectrum of 
vendors. The ability to introduce innovation into the acquisition process without 
inhibiting small business interests is a key aspect of the success of on-line reverse 
auctioning. Agencies were also able to access vendors worldwide. One reverse auction by 
an agency in Germany purchased computers from an industry leader in the United States. 
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Extended Max Bid 
Product                                      _ . Price 
Extended Final Bid 
Price 
Total $ 
Saved % Saved 
Laptops $14,000 $6,560 $7,440 53.14% 
Eyepiece Assembly $550,000 $261,500 $288,500 52.45% 
Notebook Computers $186,000 $108,000 $78,000 41.94% 
Desktop Computers $197,000 $115,000 $82,000 41.62% 
Office supplies $10,000 $6,000 $4,000 40.00% 
Hardware for Messaging System $230,000 $138,850 $91,150 39.63% 
Computers 800 MHz $41,000 $24,900 $16,100 39.27% 
Hot Water Heaters $20,000 $12,200 $7,800 39.00% 
PC Card $12,200 $7,600 $4,600 37.70% 
Electrical Connector Plugs $118,000 $78,000 $40,000 33.90% 
Computers 800 MHz $256,500 $175,500 $81,000 31.58% 
Dishwashers $22,000 $15,700 $6,300 28.64% 
Link Assembly part $207,900 $149,000 $58,900 28.33% 
Computers 866 MHz $806,000 $582,400 $223,600 27.74% 
Modular Office Buildings $24,000 $17,400 $6,600 27.50% 
Computer Hardware $500,000 $368,008 $131,992 26.40% 
Dishwashers, Ranges, Refrigerators $31,000 $23,300 $7,700 24.84% 
Computers $266,000 $205,800 $60,200 22.63% 
Zip Drives $4,950 $3,900 $1,050 21.21% 
Secure Fax Machines $6,891 $5,511 $1,380 20.03% 
Appliances $42,000 $33,600 $8,400 20.00% 
Desktop Computers $147,000 $118,000 $29,000 19.73% 
Computers 733 MHz $46,000 $37,000 $9,000 19.57% 
Overhead Projector $4,100 $3,300 $800 19.51% 
Goats $13,000 $10,000 $3,000 19.23% 
Computers $334,900 $275,800 $59,100 17.65% 
Collar Assembly part $145,425 $121,500 $23,925 16.45% 
Color Printer $72,000 $60,800 $11,200 15.56% 
Brake Link $114,100 $98,000 $16,100 14.11% 
Paper $43,000 $37,328 $5,672 13.19% 
Multipurpose Paper $22,500 $19,700 $2,800 12.44% 
Fax Machines $2,500 $2,200 $300 12.00% 
Computers $60,000 $53,600 $6,400 10.67% 
Supplemental Armor $42,630 $38,454 $4,176 9.80% 
Lumber $17,000 $15,400 $1,600 9.41% 
Sun Microsystems $1,052,000 $959,000 $93,000 8.84% 
Sun Equipment $1,847,000 $1,717,500 $129,500 7.01% 
Desktop Computers $45,900 $43,200 $2,700 5.88% 
DVD & Camcorder $8,200 $7,800 $400 4.88% 
Grenade Launcher $11,500 $10,990 $510 4.43% 
Tool Kits $90,000 $89,500 $500 0.56% 
Hydraulic Wrench $434,280 $434,280 $0 0.00% 
Photo Workshop $7,000 $7,000 $0 0.00% 
Table 4.1 Total Savings [Ref. 17] 
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After nearly one year the initiative has proven the potential for savings exists. 
However, the program has not expanded the use of reverse auctions for services. 
The potential for savings and flexibility of the system draw much attention. Other 
considerations exist besides savings. The contracting officer must maintain a balance 
between all competing demands. Dick Hunter, Vice-President for Fulfillment and 
Supply-Chain Management, points out the other side of reverse auctions. 
So auctions are not a silver bullet. Auctions and exchanges have fueled the 
thinking that price is everything. But there is more to procurement of 
materials than just price. Quality, service, technology, responsiveness, and 
the willingness to improve common processes also are very critical to 
driving down the total cost of material. [Ref. 31] 
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V.      CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.       CONCLUSIONS 
The reverse auction represents a change to the way acquisitions are priced. A 
dynamic pricing model replaces the static model. The research concludes there are 
advantages to using a reverse auction and real monetary savings. This chapter presents 
conclusions from the data presented in Chapter III and the analysis from Chapter IV. The 
conclusions represent inferences and deductions made from the research. Conclusions are 
grouped in three categories: 1) description; 2) future use; and 3) savings. 
The items acquired span a spectrum from Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) to 
Military Specification (MILSPEC). The COTS items are readily available in the market 
place and are bought by non-Government buyers. The availability and demand of these 
products make them ideal for reverse auctions because there are many suppliers. The 
MILSPEC items are designed and built to a very specific military standard. However, the 
MILSPEC items reviewed in depth were not new requirements. They were previously 
acquired and the reverse auction was simply a replenishment buy. In this sense, the 
reverse auction is not the appropriate strategy for a new requirement built to a MILSPEC. 
It is appropriate for a MILSPEC item in which competition with proven ability to 
produce the specific item exists. 
A second aspect of the description category is the criteria for selection. These 
reverse auctions chose Lowest Price Technically Acceptable (LPTA) as the selection 
criteria. LPTA is the most appropriate method because the strategy reduces or eliminates 
non-price factors in the evaluation. Non-price evaluation factors allow the selection to be 
more objective and streamlined. 
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The third aspect of the description category is the number of items acquired in a 
reverse auction. The range spans from one to the hundreds. The underlying premise is 
that higher numbers, combined requirements, may allow the Government to take 
advantage of Economic Order Quantities (EOQ). Success was not limited to small or 
large acquisitions, nor did a relationship exist between the savings rate and the quantity 
acquired. 
The second category of conclusions revolves around the potential for the future 
use of reverse auctions. General Services Administration (GSA) vendors were used in all 
three cases reviewed. The research did not lead to insight pertaining to the entire sample 
of reverse auctions. Obviously, GSA vendors streamline the process when determining 
responsibility and responsiveness. Future use should expand past the sole use of GSA 
vendors. All of the auctions in the research were for goods. The reverse auction has not 
demonstrated the ability to acquire services. The increase in the amount of dollars spent 
for the acquisition of services make this a logical path to pursue. Finally, the research did 
not present the ability to acquire goods based on "Best Value." The most likely reason for 
this relates to the item description. Successful reverse auctions occur when the items are 
commercial in nature and easily defined. There is little room to innovate the production 
or add value other than in price. 
The final category is savings. Savings were previously defined as the differential 
between the contracting officer's determination of a fair and reasonable price (max bid 
price) and the final bid price for award. The monetary difference represents savings to the 
command. The percentage of savings in each reverse auction ranged from zero to over 
50%. The mean savings rate was 21.83%. The total savings achieved in the 43 reverse 
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auctions reviewed was $1,606,395. This value equates to 19.82% dollars saved by the 
command while meeting the mission. A key aspect tied to the savings achieved is the 
necessity for competition. In the dynamic pricing arena, the perception that competition 
exists does not hold value. If only one vendor shows up, the bid price does not move 
below the maximum established prior to the auction. In two cases only one vendor 
participated in the auction and the savings achieved were zero. Zero savings means the 
item was acquired at the value deemed fair and reasonable. 
Overall, the pilot program has been successful for the Army and sister services. 
Many lessons were learned. The process continues to get better because lessons learned 
were incorporated into the model. While there are limitations to its effective use, the 
attempt to innovate the acquisition process based on current commercial methods has put 
another tool in the acquisition toolkit. 
B.       ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Chapters II and IV provided more insight to the research questions. Brief answers 
to the research questions are presented here. 
1.        Primary Research Question 
What is the best use of a reverse auction as an acquisition tool by United 
States Army contracting agencies? 
The best use of a reverse auction is to use it as a pricing tool. The reverse 
auction does not relieve the contracting officer of any duties or responsibilities in the 
acquisition process. Reverse auctions are not "silver bullets" designed for use in all 
situations. Reverse auctions are a tactic to source non-strategic commodity items. 
Limitations and constraints affect the usefulness. The reverse auction simply allows 
vendors to assess their bid against the competition. Vendors are allowed to adjust their 
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bid to remain competitive for the award. This process refines the contracting officer's 
initial assessment of a fair and reasonable price. The process represents efficiency in 
establishing a fair and reasonable price. 
The competitive nature of a reverse auction ensures the Government pays 
no more than what is fair and reasonable according to the current market conditions." The 
differential between the Government's assessment of the market and the actual market 
represents savings to the command. 
2.        Secondary Research Questions 
a. What is a reverse auction ? 
Essentially, a reverse auction is the opposite of an auction. Instead of 
many buyers bidding the price of something up, there are many sellers bidding the price 
down. In a reverse auction one buyer is offering his purchase for numerous sellers to bid 
for his patronage. The sellers successively bid the price down until no one is willing to 
offer a lower bid. Additionally, technology has allowed this process to be conducted on- 
line via a web-based interface in real time. 
b. What is a good candidate for reverse auction ? 
The goods acquired ranged from COTS to MILSPEC. The overwhelming 
preponderance of items was COTS in nature. While a small percentage of the items were 
military in nature, a successful reverse auction would not include the acquisition of a 
newly developed, complicated MILSPEC system. The underlying premise is that the item 
is easily defined; competition exists for manufacturing and distributing the item; the 
civilian community readily acquires the items; and price is the determining selection 
factor. The selection does not include services at this time. 
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c. How is the opening bid price established? 
Historical prices paid adjusted for inflation, Independent Government 
Estimates, and market research provide the insight to establish competitive maximum 
bids. In essence, the same methods to determine a fair and reasonable price are used to 
establish the opening bid price. 
d. Does a reverse auction provide savings to the Government? 
A reverse auction strategy seems to provide significant monetary savings. 
In the 43 auctions reviewed in this research, the mean savings was 21.83%. However, the 
research did not measure or conclude if any time savings were realized. 
e. What factors must be considered in determining whether a 
requirement is suitable for use of reverse auction techniques? 
Three factors must be' considered prior to using a reverse auction to 
acquire goods. First, the item description must resemble COTS. The closer the item is to 
COTS, the more likely a reverse auction approach is appropriate. Along with that is the 
priority of price in the selection (LPTA). Second, the ability to establish a fair and 
reasonable maximum bid price is essential to a successful reverse auction. If the price is 
established too low, vendors will not participate. Third, competition for the item must 
exist in the market place. Market research is essential to understanding the market for 
items. Market research helps determine the level of all three factors. 
/        Are there any statutory issues associated with executing a reverse 
auction? 
The 1997 FAR rewrite removed the language that prohibited auctioning. 
However, reverse auction bidders must give their approval for their bids to be seen by 
competitors prior to the reverse auction commencing. 
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C.       RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Establish a Users Guide to the Army's Reverse Auction 
The Army's initiative to develop and implement use of an on-line reverse auction 
tool is one year old. The process and key players have changed over the course of the 
year. Unfortunately, there is not a single source guide for users to query. The personnel 
involved in the reverse auction on a daily basis represent the expertise in the field. 
Approximately one third of the auctions reviewed were conducted by Army activities. In 
order to expand the use of the reverse auction by Army activities, a user's guide should 
be written for dissemination. The guide can also help educate the contractor community 
better understand the process. 
2. Expand the Use of Reverse Auctions to Acquire Services 
All of the auctions reviewed were for the acquisition of goods. Recently, the 
dollars spent by the Department of Defense (DOD) on services surpassed the amount 
spent on goods. The future use of the reverse auction in acquisition for services is a 
logical path. The use of performance specifications is a likely choice over detailed 
statements of work (SOW). The question is not whether to use or not use a reverse 
auction for the acquisition of services, but when. The research recommends reverse 
auction techniques be applied to the acquisition of services. 
3. Minimize Future Policies Regarding the Use of Reverse Auctions 
The procedures for using a reverse auction strategy are still developing. 
Establishing the right user interface is a constant challenge. The process is simply still 
evolving. In order for the Army to maintain progress the tactics, techniques, and 
procedures must be developed. Any statutory or policy implementation restricting 
innovation with this process will have detrimental effects on its usefulness. The best 
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recommendation is to let the process evolve into a well-defined procedure before 
considering any policy regarding its use. 
D.       AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
1. Future Reverse Auctions 
Future research in this area should attempt to capture other than monetary savings 
and efficiencies offered by the on-line reverse auction process. As well, research should 
analyze successive buys of similar items to assess any change in the savings rates realized 
compared to previous acquisitions. 
2. Reverse Auction Process Analysis 
Future research should analyze the on-line reverse auction process using a 
knowledge inference system in order to identify pathologies and remedies. The research 
should define and measure the current process and suggest changes to make the process 
more efficient. 
3. Contractor Perspective 
Future research should analyze the effect of reverse auctions on contractors, 
particularly small and disadvantaged businesses. The contractor's perspective would 
provide an insight to the process not currently expressed. 
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